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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060974-CA

v.
MARK LEFEVRE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree
felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor;
and interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor
(R. 175-77).1

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's suppression
motion where the uniformed officer observed defendant, a known
drug abuser, exhibiting multiple classic symptoms of central

1

The two drug charges were subject to enhancement because
defendant committed the crimes in a drug-free zone and had two
previous drug-related convictions (R. 181: 134-35).
1

nervous system stimulant use; where the officer observed what
appeared to be a lightbulb, commonly used as a drug pipe,
protruding from defendant's pants pocket; and where defendant
used violent physical force to resist the officer's attempt to
frisk him?
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual
findings underlying its ruling on a motion to suppress.

However,

it grants the trial court no deference regarding the application
of law to underlying factual findings.
App 228, 1 7, 581 UT Adv. Rep. 19.

State v. Garcia, 2007 UT

"The trial court's ultimate

determination of the level of a police stop is a legal conclusion
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness."

State v. Bean,

869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. . . .
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), possession of drug paraphernalia, and
interference with an arresting officer (R. 1-2). After a
preliminary hearing and bindover to district court, defendant
filed a suppression motion, which the trial court denied (R. 662

76; R. 107-13 at addendum A ) .
charged (R. 155).

A jury convicted defendant as

The court sentenced defendant to concurrent

terms of zero-to-five years in prison, 365 days in jail, and 180
days in jail, with credit for time served (R. 175-77).

The court

ordered the sentence to run consecutive to the prison sentence
defendant was already serving (Id.).

Defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal (R. 178-79).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On a September night in 2005, Officer John Barson, a Provo
police officer and drug recognition expert, was acting as a
"cover officer" for several other officers who were investigating
an unrelated incident in a well-lit parking lot of an apartment
complex (R. 112, R. 180: 5, R. 181: 44-45).

Standing away from

the other officers, Barson either heard or peripherally saw
defendant approach him from behind (R. 180: 14, R. 181: 46).

2

To confirm the correctness of the trial court's ruling on
defendant's suppression motion, the State cites to the trial
transcript as well as to both the court's pretrial ruling on the
suppression motion and the preliminary hearing testimony.
Appellate courts that consider both pretrial and trial evidence
in reviewing a pretrial ruling generally do so only in the
context of affirming
the trial court's pretrial ruling. United
States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236,
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev, 816 F.2d
980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048,
1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 879 S.W.2d
749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d
686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). The principle
unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but
will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the
district court at the time it ruled. To date, Utah has not
considered the question.
3

Barson turned and saw defendant "walk[ing] directly towards me,
and then within a few feet of me actually deviated his course and
walked past me, coming within four or five feet of me" (R. 181:
46, R. 180: 5 ) .
The first thing Barson noticed about defendant was his
"unusual" manner of walking (R. 181: 47; accord R. 180: 15, R.
112).

He testified, "[Defendant] walked in almost a march, a

soldier or very aggressive soldier[-]style clipped walking
manner" (R. 181 at 46; accord R. 112, R. 180: 5 ) . Barson then
described in more detail what he saw:
As I observed him I noted that his hands were
down the sides and he was clenching and
unclenching his hands as he walked. As he
approached me, he wasn't looking directly at
me. As he turned away from me, he jerked his
head to the side, looked at me, and then
jerked it back to center, more aggressively
than I just did, rather than just turning his
head and looking at me, as normally would be
done. . . . I also noticed, as I observed his
hands, that in his right front pants pocket,
the top of a lightbulb was protruding from
his pants.
(R. 181 at 47; accord R. 180: 5-6).

Continuing to observe

defendant, the officer noted that defendant "with his hand,
touched the lightbulb, realized that it was exposed, lifted his
shirt, the tail of his T-shirt up, and pulled it down over the
lightbulb to conceal it from me, it appeared" (R. 181: 49, R.
180: 6 ) .
Tallying his observations, Officer Barson concluded:
The combination of his mannerisms, the way he
was walking, the head motion, the clenching
4

of the fists, those are all very classic
indicators of the presence of a cental
nervous system stimulant. Uncontrolled motor
contract - or muscle contraction, and the
presence of the lightbulb, which is a very,
very common mechanism used to consume
methamphetamine, I believed he was in a [sic]
possession possibly of paraphernalia and that
he was under the influence of a central
nervous system stimulant, such as
methamphetamine. [3]
R. 181: 49; accord R. 180: 6, 9 ) . The officer's conclusion
comported with his prior knowledge that defendant was a
methamphetamine user (R. 112, R. 180: 6 ) .
Still engaged in his duties as cover officer, Barson watched
defendant walk across the parking lot, get into a vehicle, start
the engine, and begin backing out of a parking space towards
Barson and the other officers in the parking lot (R. 111-12, R.
180: 6, 17; R. 181: 50). At this juncture, free from his other
responsibilities, Officer Barson walked towards the vehicle to
investigate his suspicions, drawing defendant's attention by
knocking first "very loudly" on the trunk lid and then on the
rear and front driver's side windows (R. 180: 7; accord R. 181:
50).

Barson told defendant through the mostly open driver's

window that he needed to speak with him and that defendant was
not free to leave (R. Ill, R. 180: 7, R. 181: 50).

Defendant

responded by asking "Why?," closing the window to within an inch
3

A second officer, also present in the parking lot,
described defendant's unusual physical movements as "clucking,"
which he explained as "involuntary jerking of the hands, the head
. . . . that's pretty consistent with seeing a stimulant, like
methamphetamine, cocaine[-]type drug" (R. 181: 97).
5

of the top, and locking the doors (R. 180: 7, 17; R. 181: 51).
Barson told defendant he was conducting an investigation and
asked for his driver's license, registration, and proof of
insurance (R. 180: 7, R. 181: 51, 74, 76).

Defendant slipped his

license through the crack in the window (R. 180: 7, R. 181: 51,
52) .
Officer Barson testified that he observed defendant become
frantic inside the vehicle (R. Ill, R. 180: 8, R. 181: 51). He
"was turning around and looking directly behind him, looking at
360 degrees, through all the windows . . . [in] constant motion,
twisting around inside the seat" (R. 180: 8, 9 ) . Barson surmised
he was checking to see if he could escape (R. 180: 8, R. 181: 5152).

Barson's concern for his own personal safety increased when

he saw defendant begin to pick up and move items inside the
cluttered vehicle (R. 181: 52). He instructed defendant to turn
off the engine (R. 180: 8 ) . Defendant initially refused, engaged
in several verbal exchanges with the officer through the cracked
window, and then eventually complied (R. 180: 8-9, R. 181: 52).
With defendant still in the locked vehicle and none of his
suspicions allayed, Officer Barson reiterated that he still
needed to talk with defendant and that he was not free to leave
(R. Ill, R. 180: 8, R. 181: 52). Seeing defendant "continue[] to
flip around very frantically inside the vehicle, looking outside
of all the windows," and "worried about [his] safety," Barson
ordered defendant to get out of the vehicle (R. 181: 53).

6

Defendant refused.

Barson ordered him out a second time.

Defendant then tried futilely to put the car into gear (Id., R.
180: 9). Finally, when Officer Barson drew his weapon and tapped
on the glass, defendant unlocked the doors and complied (R. 180:
20, R. 181: 54).
Barson reholstered his weapon.

As defendant got out of the

car, Barson saw "an approximately three-foot long flat blade
screwdriver tucked between the edge of the driver's seat and the
door, right underneath [defendant's] left hand" (R. 181: 54).
Concerned about other weapons, the officer instructed defendant
to turn towards the vehicle for a Terry frisk (R. 180: 10).
Instead, defendant moved towards an opening between Barson and
another officer who had approached (R. 181: 54). Barson
attempted to put defendant against the vehicle to frisk him, at
which point defendant "began to flail his arms and attempted to
twist around away from [the officer]" (R. 180: 10). The two
officers took defendant to the ground, face down.

Defendant

lifted his waist and buttocks, twisting violently, while Barson
tried to use his own knee to push defendant back down.

In the

process, defendant's tailbone hit Barson's knee, "bruising the
top of [his] knee rather severely" (R. 181: 55; accord R. Ill, R.
180: 10).
The two officers finally succeeded in handcuffing defendant.
Officer Barson testified, however, that defendant "continued to
struggle.

We had to hold him on the ground for several minutes

7

until he calmed down" (R. 181: 56). The officers eventually
stood defendant up.

Searching his pants pockets, they found the

light bulb, which had been hollowed-out to use as a pipe, and
three baggies with a total of nearly 20 grams of marijuana (R.
Ill, R. 180: 10-11, R. 181: 56-59, 109).

Searching his vehicle,

the officers found a small duffle bag containing a used glass
methamphetamine pipe (R. 110-11, R. 180: 11, R. 181: 62-63).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted
his suppression motion because Officer Barson lacked reasonable
suspicion to justify a level two seizure of defendant, let alone
probable cause to justify a level three arrest.

See R. 68-72.

Consequently, he contends, all evidence seized should be
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful detention.
Defendant's argument lacks merit.

See R. 66-67.

The officer had

reasonable suspicion to effect a level two detention.

He

observed defendant exhibiting multiple classic symptoms of
central nervous system stimulant use.

He observed what appeared

to be a lightbulb—commonly used as a drug pipe—sticking out of
defendant's front pocket.
methamphetamine user.

He also knew the defendant was a

As the trial court ruled, "These are

reasonable, articulable facts that amount to more than a mere
hunch that the defendant possessed illegal drugs'' (R. 109-10 at
addendum A ) .

8

Based on articulated reasonable suspicion, the officer
executed a level two detention, making clear his intent by
repeatedly telling defendant he was not free to leave.
Subsequently, when defendant used physical force to resist the
officer's frisk, the officer had probable cause to escalate the
encounter into a level three arrest and conduct a search of
defendant's person and vehicle pursuant to that arrest.

The

trial court so ruled and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
SUPPRESSION MOTION WHERE THE UNIFORMED
OFFICER OBSERVED DEFENDANT, A KNOWN
METHAMPHETAMINE USER, EXHIBITING MULTIPLE
CLASSIC SYMPTOMS OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM
IMPAIRMENT; WHERE THE OFFICER OBSERVED WHAT
APPEARED TO BE A LIGHTBULB, COMMONLY USED AS
A DRUG PIPE, PROTRUDING FROM DEFENDANT'S
PANTS POCKET; AND WHERE DEFENDANT USED
VIOLENT PHYSICAL FORCE TO RESIST THE
OFFICER'S ATTEMPT TO FRISK HIM
Defendant argues on appeal that he was subject to a level
two seizure, unsupported by reasonable suspicion.

Accordingly,

he asserts that all evidence subsequently seized from him must be
suppressed as a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

See Br. of Aplt.

at 7-8.
The trial court agreed that the encounter began as a level
two seizure but found ample reasonable suspicion to support it.
See R. 109-10 at addendum A.

In addition, the court determined

that when defendant forcefully resisted the officer's attempt to

9

frisk him, the officer lawfully escalated the encounter to a
level three arrest.

See R. 108-09.

Then, pursuant to the

arrest, the officer lawfully searched defendant's person and
vehicle.

Consequently, the trial court denied defendant's

motion.
The trial court's ruling is correct.

At this juncture,

defendant does not dispute that he was subject to a level two
seizure.4

See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.

1994)("[A] level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer

A

by means of physical

force or show of authority has in some way restrained the
liberty' of a person" (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 552 (1980))).

Indeed, where the officer explicitly

told defendant he was not free to leave, there can be no question
that he was seized.

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437

(1991) (seizure under Fourth Amendment will be found if, "taking
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter,
the police conduct would ^have communicated to a reasonable
person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence
and go about his business'") (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486

4

Defendant made a different argument in the trial court.
There, he argued that he was subject to a level one voluntary
encounter. See R. 69-71, 110. For this reason alone, this Court
may choose to reject his claim. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 689
P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984)(defendant must specifically state to trial
court same grounds for objection that he presents on appeal). In
any event, his appellate claim fails on the merits.
10

U.S. 567, 569 (1988)); accord Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; State
v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997).
The issue, then, is whether Officer Barson had reasonable
suspicion to detain defendant.

This Court has stated:

To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment,
the seizure must be based on specific
articulable facts which, together with
rational inferences drawn from them, would
lead a reasonable person to conclude
defendant had committed or was about to
commit a crime.
State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)).

There is no

bright line test for determining when reasonable suspicion
exists.

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991).

Courts employ a totality of the circumstances test, recognizing
that police officers, by virtue of their specialized experience,
can sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens
would not.

Svkes, 840 P.2d at 827; State v. Miller, 740 P.2d

1363, 1366 n.2 (Utah App. 1987).
In this case, Officer Barson, with ten years' experience and
training as a drug recognition expert, articulated several
behavioral anomalies that he observed in defendant and knew were
associated with central nervous system stimulant use.
Specifically, he cited defendant's strange, "soldier[-]style
clipped walking manner," his jerky head movements, and the
repeated clenching and unclenching of his hands (R. 181: 46, 47,
49; R. 112). As part of the totality of the circumstances, the

11

officer was aware that defendant was a methamphetamine user (R.
180: 6). Finally, the officer observed a light bulb protruding
from defendant's pants pocket and then saw defendant cover it
from his view with his shirt tail (R. 181: 49). The officer also
knew that light bulbs are commonly used as pipes to ingest
methamphetamine (Id. at 48). Under the totality of these factual
circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and
investigate defendant for possession of paraphernalia and
possession or use of controlled substances.5
Lawfully detained pursuant to reasonable suspicion,
defendant refused to cooperate with the officer.

Locked in his

car with a single window cracked open, defendant initially
refused to turn off the engine and get out of the vehicle (R.
181: 52-54).

When he finally complied and Officer Barson tried

to frisk him for weapons, defendant forcefully resisted by
flailing his arms and trying to twist away, requiring two offices
to subdue him (Id. at 55). As soon as defendant began forcefully
interfering with the officer who lawfully detained him, he
committed a crime in the officer's presence, thus giving that
officer probable cause to escalate the encounter into a level

5

Indeed, Officer Barson also had a duty to investigate
further. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah App.
1994) (when police officer observes conduct raising suspicion of
criminal activity, officer "*has not only the right but the duty
to make observations and investigations to determine whether the
law is being violated; and if so, to take such measures as are
necessary in the enforcement of the law'") (citation omitted).
12

three arrest.

See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Utah 2004)

(criminalizing interference with arresting officer).

At that

point, Officer Barson was fully justified in searching both
defendant's person and his car incident to his lawful arrest.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); State v. Trane,
2002 UT 97, f 23, 57 P.3d 1052 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count each of possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a third degree felony; possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; and interference with an
arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J ^ d a y of August, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

13

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, 90 East Center Street, P.O. Box
1895, Orem, Utah 84059, this fB^day of August, 2007.
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Addendum

r\\-tzu
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah Coumy, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 051404084

MARKLEFEVRE,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court having
carefully considered and reviewed the file in this matter, the memoranda submitted by both parties,
having heard oral arguments, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court now hereby makes the
following Ruling.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on May
30, 2006.

2.

The State filed a Response on June 13, 2006

3.

The defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on June 22,
2006.

4.

On July 5,2006 this Court calendared the matter for oral arguments. Both parties submitted
and this Court indicated it would rule in writing.

/~» -e -*

f\

II.
FACTS
1.

On September 20, 2005, officers of the Provo Police Department responded to a call at 250
South 1000 West in Provo, Utah. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 4:24-25 (May 17,2006). There, the officers
were met by a number of individuals in an apparently threatening situation. Id.

2.

In the course of performing his duties relative to the call, Officer Barson noted Mr. Lefevre the defendant in this case - walking past him demonstrating a robotic, "soldier like" motion.
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 5:12-18.

3.

Officer Barson also noted that Mr. Lefevre repeatedly flexed his hands into fists. Prel. Hrg.
Tr. 6:1-2.

4.

The officer additionally noted what appeared to be a lightbulb protruding from Mr. Lefevre's
pants pocket. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 6:1 -6. These observations occurred in the parking lot area of an
apartment complex.

5.

Officer Barson was (and is) a certified Drug Recognition Specialist, and was familiar with the
outward symptoms caused by the use of particular drugs. Specifically, the officer understood
that jerky, robotic movement is oftentimes an indication of methamphetamine use.
Additionally, Officer Barson knew that hollowed-out light bulbs are used as a kind of "makeshift" pipe for the ingestion of methamphetamine.

6.

In addition to these facts, the officer was personally acquainted with the defendant and was
acquainted with the defendant's history of drug abuse. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 6:9-14. While relevant,
this fact is less significant and given less weight than the other observations and absent the
preliminary observations could not form a basis for further inquiry. (It would have been a
2

Level I encounter.)
7.

Officer Barson, on foot, followed the Mr. Lefevre and observed the defendant enter a vehicle
and attempt to drive away - apparently while under the influence of some type of drug Officer Barson, still on foot, stopped the vehicle and attempted to engage Mr. Lefevre in
discussion. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 6:17-7:5.

8.

Mr. Lefevre expressed his desire to not speak with the Officer Barson and attempted to drive
away. Officer Barson replied that the defendant was not free to leave and requested the
defendant's identification. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 7:20-8:3.

9.

Apparently, the officer had to repeat several times to Mr. Lefevre that he was not free to leave.
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 8:7-12.

10.

Officer Barson noted that Mr. Lefevre's movements in his vehicle were frantic and constant.
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 8:15-9:2. Additionally, the officer noted that Mr. Lefevre's eyes were bloodshot. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 9:10-12.

11.

After some time Mr. Lefevre voluntarily exited his vehicle, but when Officer Barson
attempted to perform a weapons search of the defendant, he began resisting and "flail(ing) his
arms." Prel. Hrg. Tr., 10:3-8.

12.

A nearby officer helped Officer Barson gain control of Mr. Lefevre.

13.

The incident was violent enough that Officer Barson sustained a severe bruise to his knee.
Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10:10-12.

14.

Once Mr. Lefevre was in custody the officers proceeded to search his person. They
discovered he was, indeed, carrying a hollowed-out light bulb that had apparently been used
as a drug pipe. Additionally, Mr. Lefevre was in possession of marijuana. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10:
14-23.

15.

A "search incident to arrest" of Mr. Lefevre's vehicle revealed additional drugs, and drug
3

paraphernalia. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 11:11-12:13.

III.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The defendant argues that Officer B arson violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching
his person without so much as reasonable suspicion. Thus, evidence obtained as a result of the
unwarranted search and illegal detention should be suppressed.
The State, on the other hand, argues that Officer Barson's and the defendant's interaction
began as a Level II encounter supported by reasonable suspicion. Additionally, the State argues that
Officer Barson had probable cause to affect an arrest of the defendant because of his refusal to
cooperate with the investigating officers and that the illicit materials discovered in subsequent
searches were properly discovered by the officers.

III.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court rejects the defendant's characterization of the initial contact between
Officer Barson and the defendant as being a Level I encounter. To properly affect a Level II
encounter Officer Barson needed reasonable articulable facts that justified his further investigation
of the defendant. See, State v. Menke, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut App. 1987). It is clear to this Court that
those facts were present. The officer observed motion consistent with illicit drug use. The officer
observed what appeared to be a lightbulb commonly used as a drug pipe. The officer was also aware
of the defendant's history of drug abuse1. These are reasonable, articulable facts that amount to more

1

As stated in section II of this ruling, the defendant's history of drug use would notbo an
appropriate sole basis for an officer to conduct a Level II encounter. However, that fact, when viewed in
connection with the totality of the circumstances presented here, reasonably heightened Officer Barson's
4

than a mere hunch that the defendant possessed illegal drugs. See, id. Also, as the State correctly
points out, Officer B arson did not merely have the option of investigating the defendant, but rather,
the officer had the duty to investigate whether the law had, or was being broken. See, State v. Contrel,
886 P.2d 107, 110 (Ut. App. 1994). This Court notes that the defendant attempted to drive away
while apparently under the influence of drugs. Thus, the defendant presented a potentially serious
threat to the innocent traveling public. That fact alone, in the view of this Court, demanded that the
officer investigate the defendant.
The defendant makes much ado about his attempt to drive away and the officer's refusal to
let the defendant depart. Were this a case of a Level I encounter that argument would hold sway with
this Court, but, as stated above, the reasonable facts as articulated by Officer Barson vitiates that
argument. This was clearly a lawful Level II encounter from the outset. Consequently, the
defendant's subsequent resistance to, and interference with, the lawful orders of Officer Barson and
other involved officers was a violation of the law.
Utah law provides that:"(l) A person is guilty of interference with a public servant if he: (a)
uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere
with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function." Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-301 (a) (2005). The State has also correctly cites Utah case law relative to interference which
states that "it must appear that a duly constituted public officer engaged in the performance of an
official duty was obstructed or resisted by the defendant." In re State in Interest ofHurley, 501 P.2d
111 (Utah 1972) (internal citation omitted).
The defendant's actions while in his vehicle with Officer Barson attempting to engage him

suspicion and became part of the circumstances that justified investigation of the defendant. The
defendant's history is an ancillary, supporting fact. Officer Barson would have exceeded legal bounds if
he had detained the defendant simply based on the defendant's history. A level I encounter would be as
far as the Officer could go without other suspicious facts or evidence.
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in conversation were certainly uncooperative and could, by a jury, be found to meet the statutory
definition of interference. Those actions, quite possibly, met the probable cause standard necessary
for Officer Barson to escalate to a Level III encounter. Whether that was the officer's intent or not
is unclear, but in this Court's view at the point that the defendant began to interfere with Officer
Barson's proper Level II encounter and investigation, Officer Barson was justified in escalating the
encounter.
If there were any doubt about the defendant's attempt to interfere with and resist the officers,
the defendant did away with that doubt by his overt resistance once outside of the vehicle. From that
point on, the officers were certainly justified in detaining, searching, and arresting the defendant. His
actions easily meet the Level III encounter probable cause threshold justifying arrest. A search
incident to arrest of the defendant's person and of the vehicle he had just exited was justified.
Consequently, this Court cannot find that any of the illicit drugs, or accompanying paraphernalia was
improperly obtained, and should, thus, be suppressed at trial.

IV,
RULING
For the reasons stated above the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied.
Signed this

/&-

day of July, 2006.
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